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In the wake of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, the notion of “fake news” and Russian 
election interference became somewhat interchangeable. We argue that “fake news” 
insufficiently describes the Russian disinformation campaign. Our analysis of Facebook ad 
texts shows that they incorporate emotional appeals differently at unique moments in the 
political campaign of 2016. We use sentiment analysis to demonstrate the use of positive 
and negative emotional messages. Sentiment ratings dipped to more negative scores 
before the November 2016 election and rose to new positive heights after the election. 
This provides some evidence that the varying uses of positive sentiment and negative 
sentiment may have been strategic. 
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On December 8, 2016, Hillary Clinton made a speech decrying the role of “fake news” on social media. 
She warned her audience that fake news had real-world consequences, possibly a reference to her recent loss 
in the 2016 presidential election. The following month, President Trump, in a curt explanation on why he would 
not call on a CNN reporter at a press conference, said it was because they were “fake news.” It is arguably 
around this time that fake news became a permanent fixture in the public lexicon (Silverman & Alexander, 
2016). 
 
The imprecision and ambiguity of the phrase fake news enable the term to mean different things for 
different people. Sometimes it is used interchangeably with “misinformation” or “disinformation.” Some simply 
call it propaganda. President Trump now uses the term like a slur with which he insults negative news coverage 
of himself or his administration. What is clear here is that fake news has been repurposed as a rhetorical device 
for political actors. We know more about Russia’s 2016 interference as a result of the Cambridge Analytica 
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scandal and subsequent Congressional investigations in 2018, as well as from the release of Special Counsel 
Robert Mueller’s (2019) report. Jamieson’s (2018) phrase viral deception captures both the distribution mode 
and the deceptive intent of the Russian-produced materials, and she helpfully positions the Facebook ads in 
the context of years of communication research that has repeatedly addressed the role of textual and visual 
appeals in campaign messages. She hints at something that Dahlgren (2018) elaborates in his discussion of 
rationality and emotionality in social media. Both underscore the position that ignoring emotion in democratic 
participatory modes is counterproductive. Dahlgren goes further in noting that emotional expression is easily 
encouraged in the online sphere, but it may undercut actual functional participation in politics. 
 
An overview of the Russian interference campaign suggests that fake news and even the bland 
term interference may be insufficient to fully grasp the Russian protocols. We argue that the combined 
affordances and platforms of social media and their abilities to quickly capture and convey emotion mean 
that we must examine materials such as the Russian Facebook ads in terms that can grapple with emotional 
intent or impact. The goal here is to analyze the Russian-inspired ads to investigate how they convey 
emotional sentiment amid timeworn themes that frame and prime salient and tumultuous political and 
cultural issues. Our unique contribution is to move beyond matters of facticity in such ads to highlight ways 
that emotional language on social media platforms is related to engagement practices. Those in turn may 
interfere with productive political participation. 
 
The Mueller (2019) report concludes that social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter had 
insufficient monitoring and content-tracking practices in place to detect content that was produced by groups 
or individuals misrepresenting themselves and their interests. The vulnerability of these platforms to trolls, 
bots, and what appears to be foreign countries attempting to interfere with domestic information flows has 
now become clear, and the platforms themselves have sought assistance from the research community on 
how they might improve their operations (Kelly, 2019). 
 
The extent of the Russian “meddling” with U.S.-directed information is more apparent from the vantage 
point of 2020, even as security personnel warn that the same sorts of meddling appear to be in play for the 
2020 elections (Goldman, Barnes, Haberman, & Fandos, 2020). A U.S. Congressional inquiry into the 2016 
meddling found that 30.4 million Facebook posts linked to Russia were shared by users (Roose, 2018). The 
original ads were publicly released in May 2018 by Congressional committees investigating Russian influence 
(Guynn, Weise, & Kelley, 2018), and were followed up by later releases from Twitter (10.4 million tweets from 
Russia’s Internet Research Agency [IRA]), YouTube (1,107 videos posted by the IRA), and Instagram. 
 
A notable quality stands out in these social media-based materials. The ads indeed conveyed some 
false information, but they also placed emotional appeals in people’s news feeds that had little to do with 
conventional truth or lies. Those ads included invitations to Facebook groups centered on divisive topics for 
the American public, the most numerous of them focusing on race, police brutality, nationalism, immigration, 
and gun rights (Kim et al., 2018). Four of those topics also were among the top-10 voting issues for the 
2016 campaign (Pew Research Center, 2016), and those same subjects frequently catalyze economic, racial, 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020)  Good News, Bad News  3029 
or cultural unrest or unease. An overview of the IRA’s strategy2 indicates a sophisticated campaign to sow 
discord among the U.S. public by focusing on these and related topics. These particular appeals—emotional, 
opinion-laden, and invoking hot-button topics—are undersold by statements such as “Russian fake news 
helped Trump win.” 
 
From this perspective we analyze the textual content in 3,519 advertisements purchased by 
Russia’s IRA and released by Facebook to the U.S. Congress. We investigate the nature of the Facebook 
advertisements’ use of emotion to generate attention, investigating how positive and negative sentiment 
might have been strategic. The results underscore the temporal flows of emotion in the Russian ad texts 




The long history of propaganda research in the communication field has yielded an understanding 
of how persuasion occurs, and it is highly relevant to any discussion of the content and possible influence 
of Facebook ads (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Katz & Lazarsfeld, 1955; Lasswell, 1927; Popkin, 1994). That 
research has investigated notions of people’s response to certain images, terms, and arguments, the effects 
accruing to conditions of message exposure and influence of sources. The way a particular category of 
messages—disinformation—operates is pertinent to the current investigation. The research literature 
reviewed distinguishes the nature of content associated with social media-based disinformation and 
examines its cognitive and emotional information-processing characteristics. Recent research on social 
media and Facebook in particular notes their memetic qualities, including their brevity (Facebook ads are a 
single page), their penchant for illustrating powerful images and text, their ability to capitalize on 
recognizable memes, their availability for liking and sharing, and of course their ability to network people. 
Those medium qualities intersect certain types of political address and participation. 
 
Disinformation, Cognitive Processing, and Fake News 
 
Academics and journalists alike argue that they should no longer use the term fake news (Gelfert, 
2018; Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014; Van Duyn & Collier, 2018). Although the actual information 
deployed in the Facebook ads was at times false, that was not its defining characteristic.3 The term is 
inaccurate and its use confuses people (Van Duyn & Collier, 2018). Disinformation more precisely can be 
defined as politically motivated and explicitly directed to depress citizen engagement and genuine political 
participation (Gelfert, 2018; Jackson, 2017). Disinformation resembles propaganda in that the goal is to 
incite citizens to action and dampen information processing characterized by deliberation and reflection 
(Stanley, 2015). The goal of propaganda is to subvert rational thinking, and effective propaganda 
encourages people to move as a collective, motivated by emotions that disregard evidence and substitute 
 
2 The term strategy is used to suggest that there is a formula behind the construction of the ad content. 
Jamieson (2018) unpacks the sequence of what she calls “the Russian courtship” (p. 119) by highlighting 
the early stage of benign appeals to signal shared interests, followed by extreme statements. 
3 Popular media have highlighted the obvious grammatical and syntactical mistakes in the Facebook ads. Those 
slips offer a clue to the ads’ provenance, but the fact remains that they were often widely circulated nonetheless. 
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emotional intensity for mindful and thoughtful response. Whether or not the information is true or false is 
secondary to whether it can sow the desired outcomes among the public. Disinformation shares that goal. 
 
From a communication research perspective, disinformation aims to trigger information-processing 
mechanisms such as priming, confirmation bias, and affective arousal that likely prompt people to like, share, 
and increase the reach of messages within an online platform context. In her 2018 book Cyberwar, Jamieson 
ably dissects the potential priming impact of the Facebook ads’ invocation of contentious issues such as 
immigration, police brutality, and attacks on the flag, among other themes. Those types of issues and appeals, 
especially in their social media incarnation, emphasize emotional content. The mode of spreading 
disinformation exploits the algorithms on social media that tend to bias sensational and evocative information 
(Jamieson, 2018; Kramer et al., 2014), enabling a “Pearl Harbor of the social media age” (Roose, 2018, p. 2). 
 
Emotion, Heuristic Processing, and Ads 
 
The dual processing model of persuasion explains how people process information and form 
attitudes, contrasting systematic or cognitive modes with heuristic or only weakly cognitive mechanisms 
(Chaiken & Ledgerwood, 2012). This literature reflects on the rapid-fire, heavily visual, and slogan-
dependent content of visual ads such as those on Facebook as opposed to lengthy written debates requiring 
time, attention, and intellectual engagement. Beyond demonstrating that there are differences in how 
certain types of information are processed, this literature underscores the widespread practice of quick and 
often biased cognitive processing (Elliott, 2008; Kahneman, 2011). In the heuristic process, people use 
comparatively less cognitive effort and instead rely on more easily accessible information such as source 
identity and status or cues that can quickly elicit affective associations (Chaiken, 1980; Chaiken & 
Ledgerwood, 2012; Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
 
The meme-like qualities and brevity associated with Facebook posts, particularly with image-based 
posts, are amenable to such processing. For instance, Buck, Chaudhuri, Georgson, and Kowta (1995) and 
Chaudhuri and Buck (1995 show that digital and more visually oriented media trigger peripheral cognitive 
responses, whereas relatively text-heavy traditional print advertisement leads to more central cognitive 
responses. Kahneman’s (2011) basic argument in Thinking Fast and Slow underscores the pervasiveness of 
“fast thinking” and the intuitive and emotional biases that can be exacerbated by the speed of digital content 
encounters. The design of Facebook ads makes the spread of false or contentious beliefs not simply an 
unfortunate side effect, but rather the intended function, operating through emotional appeals. Emotions 
are a core component for how people see the world (Marcus, 2002), and there is considerable support for 
the notion that mood, feelings, and emotions shape public opinion (Brader, 2006; Jamieson, 2018). 
 
A common mistake, however, in earlier research on emotions and politics was to treat the affective 
process as a suppressor of rational thinking (Brader, 2006). This line of thinking argues that if people were 
more rational, then they could subvert the effect of the Russian Facebook ads. This is, however, an 
antiquated way of understanding the affective and cognitive aspects of human information intake. The two 
dimensions, affective and cognitive, often work together (Kahneman, 2011). Other researchers argue 
similarly that motivated reasoning is a dynamic process that involves both affective and cognitive 
considerations (Kunda, 1990; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010; Taber & Lodge, 2006; Weeks, 2015). Lodge and 
International Journal of Communication 14(2020)  Good News, Bad News  3031 
Taber’s (2000) early theory of affective cognitive processes for motivated reasoning argues that all social 
concepts and information are tied to an affect, echoing Abelson’s (1963) earlier work affirming that once a 
cognitive node is activated, so too is its related affect. The premise is that when people encounter new 
information, they revise the affective tags attached to their conceptual memory (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; 
Clore & Isbell, 2001; Schwarz, 2011). Hence, emotional appeals can invoke affective and cognitive processes 
in ways that may be logical but not necessarily “rational.” 
 
To be effective, the Russian-placed advertisements follow typical campaign advertising formats. 
That is, political campaign ads classically involve short and simple reasons that emphasize why someone 
should support a candidate or issue (i.e., the rationale). Coupled with these messages are images, text, and 
music that evoke an emotional appeal, which Brader (2006) argues impact how the messages in the ad are 
evaluated (i.e., the affective component). The text in political ads explicitly conveys meaning and may 
convey emotion, and the imagery and tone enhance how the message is received. For example, a Facebook 
ad with the message “police brutality is out of control” is enhanced with pictures of helpless African 
Americans under attack by police. It is in this way that the message and the images work together to deliver 
the message. 
 
The impact of emotional ad appeals, however, is highly dependent on what emotion is evoked 
(Carver & Harmon-Jones, 2009; Gervais, 2017; Tannenbaum et al., 2015; Weeks, 2015). For example, 
research on political ads with a positive message, such as “enthusiastic” or “feel-good” ads, can motivate 
people toward in-group favoritism (Tannenbaum et al., 2015; Weeks, 2015). As such, these positive ads 
have shown effectiveness at reinforcing existing loyalties. Negative political ads have been shown to 
heighten partisanship and out-group antagonism (Gervais, 2017; Weeks, 2015). In fact, anger can motivate 
partisan, motivated evaluation of misinformation (Weeks, 2015). 
 
Whether campaigns use positive or negative ads is related to several factors including 
competitiveness of the race (Druckman, Kifer, & Parkin, 2010), ad sponsorship (Fowler, Ridout, & Franz, 
2016), and media platform (i.e., television or online; Borah, Fowler, & Ridout, 2018). As it relates to our 
research, scholars have found that online political ads tend to be more positive compared with traditional 
television campaign ads (Bekafigo & Pingley, 2015; Borah et al., 2018). Diffusion may gain power with more 
positive online content. Positive content spreads more quickly and thoroughly online (Berger & Milkman, 
2012). The virality of social media content is driven by physiological arousal, and social media content that 
evokes high positive or negative physiological arousal is more viral. In addition, positive content is related 
to higher arousal, making it the most effective way to spread content throughout social media. When Brady, 
Wills, Jost, Tucker, and Van Bavel (2017) examined 563,312 Twitter posts on gun control, same-sex 
marriage, and climate change, their results showed that people are 20% likelier to share or interact with 
emotionally evocative social media information. Facebook’s own sponsored research on “massive-scale 
emotional contagion” suggests that emotional states are transferable through Facebook itself (Facebook, 
n.d.). Using actual news feed content that expressed positive or negative posts, Kramer and colleagues 
(2014) found that emotions expressed by contacts on Facebook affect users’ emotions. (The research 
procedures in this study were later assessed as highly controversial.) Finally, Cyr, Head, Lim, and Stibe 
(2018) examined how message argument quality and other heuristic factors such as website design aspects 
correspond to individuals’ issue involvement, which subsequently can lead to attitude change. Their study 
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demonstrates how both central and heuristic cues function together when shaping attitudes on certain 
issues, with heuristic responses cued to visual materials. 
 
The potential for social endorsements, such as commenting, liking, or sharing ads of political 
advertisements on social media, can affect how people evaluate the ads (Borah et al., 2018 Thorson, Vraga, & 
Ekdale, 2010). Research indicates that “sharing” and “liking” social media content can strengthen social bonds 
and increase group solidarity and social capital (Pi, Chou, & Liao, 2013; Placencia & Lower, 2013). In addition, 
posts with positive appeals using humor and enthusiasm are the most likely to be shared (Borah, 2016). 
 
Bakir and McStay (2018) suggest that the Russian Facebook disinformation content used more 
emotional appeals instead of false or made-up information. The evocative nature of the IRA’s Facebook ad 
content may have incited social conflict around divisive societal issues of the day, namely immigration and 
racial bias in policing in the lead-up to 2016 U.S. presidential election, a speculation also emerging from the 
work of Ribeiro, Ufmg, Henrique, Gummadi, and Redmiles (2018). These scholars tested some of the Russian 
ad content effects with a selected sample. They conjecture that emotional appeals help to get better 
attention and also inspire group emotional behaviors within social networks, labeling the phenomenon 
socially divisive advertising and echoing results highlighted by Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes (2012). These 
researchers found that the use of affective polarization increased throughout the 2008 election campaign, 
and that it was more prominent in battleground states, a finding later reaffirmed as growing in the century’s 
second decade (e.g., Iyengar, Lelkes, Levendusky, Malhotra, & Westwood, 2019). More important, they 
found that the volume of negative advertising was positively related to affective polarization. Rooted in 
social identity theory, affective polarization posits that when social identities are made salient, people tend 
to put greater weight on their identity-relevant attitudes and favor their in-group (Hogg, Terry, & White, 
1995; Tajfel, 1969; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In-group favoritism is often accompanied by a negative bias 
toward the out-group. In the case of the Russian advertisements, it is possible that positive sentiments for 
social groups were made more salient initially and then later threatened or challenged with negative 
sentiments, the net result being antagonism across various groups. 
 
Empirical Studies on Facebook Political Advertisements 
 
Given that Facebook has become an accepted news distribution and circulation vehicle, people are 
used to seeing what loosely could be called “informational material” there. Social media platforms have 
become major venues for Americans to seek information. One recent Pew Research Center report (Matsa & 
Shearer, 2018) showed that approximately 68% of American adults indicated that they at least occasionally 
obtain news on social media; among different available social media platforms, Facebook is most commonly 
used for news consumption. About 43% of Americans who consume news from social media platforms get 
it from Facebook (Matsa & Shearer, 2018). In addition to the elevated significance of social media as a main 
information source, technological factors such as native advertising and microtargeting enable seamless, 
highly targeted content from these sources (Kim et al., 2018). Such technological affordances make social 
media platforms such as Facebook attractive places to disseminate tailored political messages during 
sensitive political events such as presidential elections. 
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Facebook’s ability to target potential recipients by geography and certain demographic 
characteristics also is highly desirable. Facebook works to balance both the advertiser’s goals and the 
Facebook user’s experience (Facebook, n.d.). For advertisers, the system works to reach their target 
audience. Users want their visit to Facebook to be positive and relevant. To achieve this balance, Facebook 
uses an automated auction system. However, unlike the “highest bid wins” method, Facebook uses an 
automated auction system that involves three factors: the bid, estimated action rates, and ad quality and 
relevance. Advertisers bid well when they are able to make their ad “relevant” to users; that is, Facebook 
generates improved placements when there is higher engagement. Facebook can estimate an ad’s “action 
rate,” the likelihood a user will take action once seeing the ad. The estimate is determined by the ad’s 
historical performance on Facebook and the target audience’s past actions. Finally, ad quality and relevance 
are determined by looking at user feedback toward an ad. Negative feedback for an ad will decrease its total 
value. If positive emotions prompt more engagement, relevance scores would be improved. This presents 
another factor in understanding how sentiment can figure into the construction of the Russian-placed ads. 
 
The reach and potential for covert sources to place content affecting users via Facebook have 
compelled researchers to try to understand where fake news and disinformation come into play in political 
matters. Analyzing advertisement content and impressions of 783 unique Facebook political advertisements 
during the 2017 United Kingdom general election campaign, Anstead, Magalhaes, Stupart, and Tambini 
(2018) found that political advertisements on Facebook resembled the issues and strategies of the wider 
campaign while allowing certain political parties to more effectively target their constituencies. Whereas the 
ability to microtarget audiences might be useful to maximize the effectiveness of political campaigns, it 
could potentially yield harmful implications, creating “filter bubbles” for individuals and cultivating populism 
(Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017). Benkler, Faris, and Roberts (2018) found evidence that Facebook 
circulates false content and hyperpartisan disinformation more often than Twitter. Furthermore, nefarious 
tampering can be attempted by malicious domestic as well as foreign institutions (Dwoskin & Romm, 2018). 
Despite Facebook’s stated commitment to cooperate fully in mounting investigations, a severe lack of 
transparency of these social media platforms’ targeting practices has long been a concern for researchers 
(Kreiss & Howard, 2010). 
 
In part because of Facebook’s opacity, only a handful of studies have managed to empirically 
examine the dynamics of foreign influence on the U.S. political agenda through social media. Some 
researchers have documented the targets behind the ads, and some have chronicled the topics invoked in 
the ads. Investigating paid ads on Facebook during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign, Kim et al. 
(2018) identified groups behind divisive issue campaigns on Facebook and the targets for such messages. 
The researchers found that approximately half of 228 total groups behind the Facebook issue campaigns in 
the 2017 election fell into a “suspicious group category,” referring to sites either taken down by Facebook 
or showing minimum activity after the election day. About 17% of these suspicious group were found to be 
Russian-linked groups. An analysis of Russia’s IRA’s 3,519 Facebook and Instagram advertisements released 
by the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence found that the IRA created 73 different 
advertisement sponsors and groups on Facebook, which in turn connected to more than 100 groups 
spreading beyond Facebook-related social media platforms to venues including Google, YouTube, MeetUp, 
and Twitter (Kim, 2018). Kim et al. (2018) and Ribeiro et al. (2018) reveal that advertisements specifically 
addressed major campaign issues, with race issue ads the most frequently and prominently distributed. 
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Furthermore, approximately 30% of total IRA group ads mentioned elections and voting, and about 8% 
contained mentions of candidate and party, corroborating the idea that IRA groups’ intended to influence 
the election (Kim, 2018), a point also emphasized by Jamieson (2018). 
 
Between 2015 and 2017, the IRA increased its ad purchases from 617 in 2015 to 1,867 in 2016 
and 1,033 in 2017. Nearly 25% of the landing pages spent more than $100, 26.8% of the pages received 
more than 1,000 clicks, and approximately 36.1% had more than 10,000 impressions.4 Of the 3,500 ads in 
the data set released by Congress, more than 50% made explicit references to race (Penzenstadler, Heath, 
& Guynn, 2018). Twenty-five percent of the ads were related to crime and police with a racial connotation, 
many involving police brutality or Black Lives Matter and social justice issues. In all, divisive racial ad buys 
averaged about 44 per month from 2015 through the summer of 2016 before seeing a significant increase 
in the run-up to the election day. Between September and November 2016, the number of race-related 
spots rose to 400. An additional 900 were posted after the November election through May 2017. This 
temporal aspect raises questions as to whether emotional sentiment in the ads changed over time as well. 
 
Finally, the Russian advertisements were carefully crafted to target specific demographic profiles. 
We know that low-income populations were targeted with immigration- and racial conflict-related 
advertisements, middle-income populations were shown ads on nationalism, and the majority of immigration 
and nationalism issue advertisements were targeted toward Whites compared with other racial/ethnic 
groups (Kim et al., 2018). Incorporating additional survey data on representative users’ tendency to report, 
approve, and identify false claims in the ads, Ribeiro et al. (2018) found that IRA ads appeared to target 
people who were more likely to believe and approve the advertisement content. 
 
Estimates by the intelligence community as conveyed to Congress indicate that more than 11.4 
million American users were exposed to those advertisements as the Facebook ads were further shared with 
other social groups. The social network strategy was to get users to “like” one of 470 IRA-constructed 
Facebook pages. According to Facebook, once liked, Facebook users automatically follow the page, which 
means that they may receive updates about the page in their news feed. Page updates can include status 
updates, shared news articles, pictures, memes, or unique content. The name or profile pictures of people 
who like the page may be shown on the page or in ads about the page, giving it more legitimacy. According 
to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, the IRA created approximately 80,000 pieces of 
unique content to share within the 470 pages they created in this fashion (House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, 2018). To date, we do not specifically know what any of this unique content 
looked like, but we know that more than 126 million Americans were exposed to it. Therefore, our analysis 
of these Facebook advertisements helps us understand the IRA tactics to connect people to networks of 
disinformation content. 
 
What specifically interests us is the emotion in the ad text, the role of affective wording in the ad text, 
and how emotion may be related to the ads’ effectiveness in terms of engagement metrics. Was there a 
dominant affective tone in the Facebook ads? Was ad sentiment related to more engagement? Finally, were 
 
4 An impression with regard to Facebook ads is a measure of how often ads were on screen for an ad’s 
target audience. 
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there changes over time in the ad sentiment? Did they appear to be linked in terms of sentiment to an election 
timeline? Although we know quite a bit about the ad targeting and the topics invoked in the ads, the emotional 
content or feelings evoked in the ad text seem to have been obscured by the discourse around fake news. The 
gaps in current studies of the ad content and presumed intentions led to our primary research questions: 
 
RQ1a: What is the valence of the emotional appeals in the Russian ads? How can we characterize them in 
terms of emotional content or sentiment? 
 
RQ1b: Is there a relationship between sentiment and engagement, as measured by clicks and impressions? 
 
RQ2: Is there a change over time in terms of sentiment in the IRA’s Facebook ads? How might such 




We analyzed the metadata in all of the 3,519 Facebook ads placed by the Russian IRA and released 
by Congress. By way of background, all 3,519 ads promoted one of the 470 IRA-created Facebook pages. 
Each advertisement was released as a two-page PDF. The first page included the metadata for the 
advertisement, which noted the ad identification; ad text; ad impressions (how often ads were on audience 
members’ pages); ad clicks (number of time people actually clicked on an impression); ad landing page 
(often a fake group site); and ad targeting, which included targeted location, excluded connections, targeted 
age range, placement, and targeted interests (see Figure 1). The second page reproduced the actual ad. In 
Figure 1, our analysis focused on the sentiment in the ad text lines. After an initial cleaning process of 
deleting ads with inconclusive or erroneous metadata, we used 3,425 advertisements for analysis. 
 
 




3036  Alvarez, Choi, and Strover International Journal of Communication 14(2020) 
To measure emotion in the text, we conducted a sentiment analysis of ad text in the data set. 
There are many different approaches to sentiment analysis, the most common focusing on document-level 
and/or individual word-level sentiment identification. Neither of these approaches was particularly effective 
for the current case because Facebook ad text generally occurs in one- to three-sentence units. The ads 
also generally incorporate an image. Therefore, we sought sentence-level analysis to study sentiment in 
Facebook ads. 
 
Ad sentiment was evaluated using the RSentiment Package in the R development framework, a 
technique developed by combining word-level sentiment analysis with natural language processing 
techniques to effectively evaluate sentiment at or near the sentence level of granularity. RSentiment is an 
unassisted sentiment analysis technique that begins by assigning each word in a unit a sentiment score 
(positive, negative, very positive, very negative, or neutral). Word-level sentiment analysis is based on the 
conical Liu–Hu opinion lexicon (Liu, Hu, & Cheng, 2005). RSentiment’s natural language processing 
framework then evaluates the text unit for positive or negative sentiment or sarcasm and assigns a 
numerical score to indicate the unit’s overall sentiment. The rating scale is continuous, with positive values 
indicating positive sentiment and negative values indicating negative sentiment. RSentiment assigns a score 
of 99 to any text unit that is likely to be sarcastic. If there are many positive and negative sentiments in the 
ad text, it is possible that RSentiment would code it as neutral; however, we did not observe that the ads 
typically contained mixed emotions. A comparative assessment of RSentiment’s accuracy found that it was 
more effective than other popular variants for social media and SMS-length units of analysis (Bose et al., 
2017). Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the most negative and positive ads based on our sentiment analysis, and 
Figure 4 is an example of a sarcastic ad. 
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Figure 2. Most negative ad. 
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Figure 3. Most positive ad. 
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Figure 4. Sarcasm example. 
 
For analytical purposes, we parsed the ad files and explored the sentiment in the ad text using 
RSentiment. Second, we sought to examine the relationship between ad sentiment and popularity—and 
hence the probability that people may have forwarded or shared the ad content and joined a Facebook group 
created by the IRA—by using the engagement measures of impressions and clicks, indicators present in the 
metadata for each ad. We note that 800 of the ads had no data regarding impressions or clicks, and we 
removed these from analyses investigating those two impact measures. 
 
For the main analysis, we conducted a multiple linear regression analysis testing the effects of 
sentiment (a continuous variable representing degree of positive and negative), sarcasm (a binary sentiment 
variable), and duration of the advertisement on the number of clicks and impressions. The continuous 
sentiment scores calculated by RSentiment ranged from -21 to 21 (M = 0.632, SD = 2.997). The raw scores 
assigned sarcasm a 99. These were recoded into a dichotomous categorical variable indicating whether the 
sentiment was sarcasm or not. The impressions and clicks variables had substantial outliers. To minimize 
this distributional problem, we calculated average impressions (M = 1165.9, SD = 3787.62) and clicks (M 
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= 1067.9, SD = 299.26) per sentiment score. The duration of the advertisement was calculated using the 
date the ads were created and ended (available in the metadata). The duration was calculated in the unit 
of seconds and then transformed into unit of days. There were 201 observations that had erroneous 
metadata (e.g., an earlier ad ending date than the ad starting date). For these and all others without the 
date information in the metadata, the duration was coded as zero. 
 
Finally, to explore the third question, we developed a timeline to plot the ads’ sentiment scores 
over time to investigate whether there were temporal trends of sentiment. Using the mean monthly 




Ad Sentiment: Positive, Neutral, or Negative? 
 
To answer the first question, we plotted the frequencies of sentiment scores across the ads. The 
analysis in Figure 5 shows that outside of ads with no sentiment (value = 0), the majority (1,474) of the ads 
had positive sentiment (values ≥ 1). In fact, ads with positive sentiment were nearly double when compared 
with negative (789), neutral (725), or sarcastic (437) ads. The high number of neutral ads is also notable. 
 
 
Figure 5. Distribution of sentiment scores across the ads. Negative scores are negative 
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Sentiment and Engagement 
 
To investigate the relationship between the ads’ sentiment and the number of impressions and 
clicks they received, we conducted two multiple regression analyses investigating effects of sentiment, 
advertisement duration, and sarcasm on impressions and clicks (calculated as average per sentiment 
scores). Table 1 summarizes the regression analysis results. 
 
Table 1. Multiple Regression Analysis Results of Sentiment, Sarcasm, and Ad Duration on the 
Advertisement Engagements. 
 Multiple linear regression Polynomial regression 
Variable B SE b t B SE b t 
Impressions per 
sentiment 
scores         
Sentiment 487.28 0.361 0.361*** 24.259 939.53 0.016 0.654*** 40.426 
Duration −8.93 0.015 −0.019 −1.269 −8.37 0.012 −0.018 −1.454 
Sarcasm −3563.57 0.045 −0.941*** −21.085 −3819.44 0.037 −1.08*** −27.411 
Sentiment2 
(quadratic)     −48.96 0.003 −0.115*** −30.621 
Sentiment3 
(cubic)     −3.95 0.001 −0.023*** −25.212 
 F(3, 3421) = 372.3***, R2 = .246 F(5, 3419) = 673.3***, R2 = .496 
Clicks per 
sentiment 
scores         
Sentiment 30.27 0.015 0.284*** 18.479 62.65 0.016 0.531*** 33.300 
Duration −0.35 0.015 −0.009 −0.611 −0.37 0.012 −0.010 −0.816 
Sarcasm −287.36 0.046 −0.960*** −20.850 −321.69 0.036 −1.075*** −29.632 
Sentiment2 
(quadratic)     −5.28 0.004 −0.150*** −40.341 
Sentiment3 
(cubic)     −0.25 0.001 −0.019*** −20.575 
 F(3, 3421) = 279.6***, R2 = .197 F(5, 3419) = 711.8***, R2 = .51 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 
Sentiment and Impressions 
 
Our fitted multiple regression model was found to explain a substantial amount of variance in the 
impressions overall, F(3, 3421) = 372.3, R2 = .246. Specifically, sentiment (b = 0.361, p < .001) and 
sarcasm (b = −0.941, p < .001) were found to be significant predictors of advertisement impressions. The 
duration of the advertisement was not a statistically significant predictor of advertisement impression (b = 
−0.019, p = .205). In other words, as the sentiment increased by one unit, the expected average impression 
per sentiment scores increased by approximately 487.28 when all other variables were statistically held 
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constant. For sarcasm, the impressions were expected to be lower by −3563.57 for advertisements with 
sarcastic sentiment compared with those that were not sarcastic when all other variables were controlled. 
 
Although the conventional multiple linear regression predicted substantial variance in impressions, 
our visual inspection of the relationship between our focal predictor sentiment and impression indicated that 
the relationship could be nonlinear. Therefore, an additional analysis using polynomial terms was conducted. 
A model including the cubic polynomial term of the sentiment scores successfully explained 49.6% of the 
variance in the impressions, F(5, 3419) = 673.3, R2 = .496. Figure 6 displays the scatterplot and fitted line 
of the cubic polynomial model. 
 
 
Figure 6. Scatterplot and cubic polynomial regression of sentiment on impressions. 
 
 
Sentiment and Clicks 
 
The second multiple linear regression model predicting the number of clicks per sentiment score 
was found to explain a significant amount of variance overall, F(3, 3421) = 279.6, R2 = .197. Similar to the 
impressions, sentiment (b = 0.284, p < .001) and sarcasm (b = −0.960, p < .001) were found to be 
statistically significant predictors. The duration of the advertisements did not significantly predict the 
advertisement clicks per sentiment score (b = −0.009, p = .541). To elaborate, as the sentiment increased 
by one unit, the expected average clicks per sentiment score were expected to increase by approximately 
30.27 when all other variables were statistically held constant. For sarcasm, the number of clicks was 
expected to be lower by −287.36 for ads with sarcastic sentiment compared with those that were not 
sarcastic when all other variables were statistically controlled. 
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A preliminary visual examination hinted at similar concerns as with the previous analysis on 
impressions. Therefore, an identical cubic polynomial regression analysis was conducted. The model with 
the cubic polynomial terms of sentiment scores significantly explained 51% of the variance in the number 




Figure 7. Scatterplot and cubic polynomial regression of sentiment on clicks. 
 
Ad Sentiment Over Time 
 
Finally, to investigate our third research question about ad sentiment changes over time, we 
examined the distribution of sentiment at different time periods. Figure 8 plots sentiment scores over time 
and appears to show little dramatic change over time in ad sentiment. The blue line, representing a 
regression on sentiment across time, appears to vary little. However, a more granular examination (see 
Figure 9) of the monthly means of ad sentiment is more revealing. There, the negative swing of the ad’s 
sentiment is visible in the period before the November 2016 election. September’s ads were especially 
negative. The positive sentiment after the election is unmistakable. The gray area represents a confidence 
interval at 95%. We can also see that the positive ads garnered more clicks in general. The timeline does 
illustrate the variance over time, and it is tempting to conclude that some of it is deliberately in line with 
domestic political events. 
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Figure 8. Mean sentiment over time. 
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Figure 9. Monthly mean sentiment over time. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
To briefly summarize the results, the majority of the ad texts were positive, followed by negative, 
neutral, and sarcastic ads. Ad text with positive sentiment garnered more impressions and clicks than did 
ads with neutral and negative sentiment. Finally, the ad text sentiment was more negative before November 
and there appears to be a swing upward immediately after the election. 
 
Our first conclusion is that these ads’ emotional content seems to be related to their being shared 
more broadly. The results underscore the power of “positive” messages (Berger & Milkman, 2012). We know 
from previous literature that social media content that evokes highly positive or negative physiological 
arousal is more viral, and that seems to be confirmed here. For Facebook specifically, posts with positive 
appeals, such as with humor and enthusiasm, are the most likely to be shared (Borah, 2016). One does not 
usually associate ads from politically motivated organizations with humor and uplifting messages, but in this 
particular case, both did occur, and the sentiment scores illustrate exactly that. Positive ads may have been 
used to grow the size of the Facebook groups the IRA was both creating and targeting, and subsequently 
these continued ads could have increased their legitimacy. (Some of the most popular Russian Facebook 
ads were for fake groups called Black Matters and Woke Blacks.) 
 
We hypothesize that a tactic of the Russia IRA to use positive emotion in the ads was to help 
inculcate the in-group–out-group antagonism on which other researchers have commented. We know that 
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when social identities are made salient, people tend to put greater weight on their identity-relevant attitudes 
and favor their in-group. Using positive messages to prime people about their relevant in-group can enhance 
a sense of identity that then produces greater outrage when attacked. It may be that the IRA deployed 
positive sentiments for social groups, such as Blacks and Latinos, to make those identity categories more 
salient and later deployed negative sentiments by exposing them to attacks, for example. The net result 
could be polarization. 
 
Our conclusions are limited in several important ways. First, any conclusion about the Russian IRA 
is incomplete without a full analysis of all of its social media content. Any attempt to outline a strategy must 
extend to the tactics used to raise membership for its Facebook pages as well as the IRA use of Twitter and 
other social media. Second, our sentiment analysis was restricted to the text that accompanied the Facebook 
but not the text in the ad picture. Although we would expect the text sentiment to be coherent, that may 
not always have been the case. Third, our inferences regarding strategic intentions behind the ads are 
necessarily somewhat speculative. 
 
Despite these limitations, the findings in this study illustrate that the Russian disinformation 
campaign is more than made-up or “fake news.” The integrated use of positive sentiment and negative 
sentiment may elicit the sort of emotional engagement that ultimately provokes concerns, perhaps about 
one’s own social group and its representation and values in broader issues; then, over time and especially 
before the election, using negative sentiment could produce anger or disaffection, and even exacerbate 
existing social cleavages between groups. Our findings suggest therefore that combatting disinformation 
must go beyond flagging information sources as suspicious or false. Rather, the ads convey emotion and 
play to the strengths of the social media platform in encouraging quick bursts of engagement typical of 
“thinking fast.” Emotional messages ultimately can contribute to feelings such as pride or anger. The Russian 
strategy, in many ways, may have worked to suggest certain ideas to different groups that they possibly 
already felt or believed were true (confirmation bias), playing off the emotional components of the ads and 
the platform that facilitate quick and unthinking reaction. Someone concerned about immigration may be 
more susceptible to advertisements that compare illegal immigrants with unlawful invaders. A red flag on 
the ad might not sway these individuals from feelings that their country is under threat. Indeed, 
Lewandowsky, Ecker, and Cook (2017) comment on “back-fire” effects of attempts that might accompany 
more rational debunking of ad content; emotional content is an armor against the rational, perhaps. The 
emotional content of the ads flies in the face of attempts to educate people to make rational decisions about 
such ads: Heuristic cognitive processing powerfully undercuts such an approach. To address this issue, social 
networking platforms themselves should have different standards for commercial and political issue 
advertising. Platforms might develop standards that evaluate sources as well as levels of emotion inherent 
in content. 
 
Last, legislation might consider tightening the reach of political advertising of all flavors that has 
proliferated since Citizens United’s legal decision which allowed for any group or individual, including foreign, 
to get involved in election campaigns with few campaign finance disclosure and reporting requirements 
(Citizens United v. Federal Election Committee, 2010). We now know that manipulated ads have been used 
widely by many players globally, including groups in the United States in state-level elections. 
Internationally, Sweden seems to have taken the lead in researching and recommending ways to counter 
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information-influence activities (Pamment, Nothhaft, Agardh-Twetman, & Fjallhed, 2018); however, more 
is known about the information-influence activities than what is known about countering them. The 
suggestions we offer are in and of themselves incomplete responses to address the threats of disinformation, 
but they do indicate that simply correcting “fake” or false information will do very little to protect against 
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